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GitHub blocks pull_request_target by default on December 2. Use the November brownouts to find what breaks

On November 9 and again on November 16, between 11 AM and 1 PM Eastern, some workflows in public repos will just fail with an annotation. GitHub is rehearsing a December 2 default, and it's the cheapest way to learn which of your bots lean on a trigger that can read secrets.

Editorial engraving of a sunny co-working library where a maintainer checks a wall clock while a contributor points to a printed list beside a calendar with two days circled.

From December 2, 2026, GitHub Actions blocks pull_request_target in public repositories unless an Actions event policy explicitly allows it. Brownouts on November 9 and 16, 16:00 to 18:00 UTC, enforce the block early. Use Insights now to find affected workflows, decide which to rewrite and which to allow by workflow file, and treat any run that fails during a brownout as a to-do, not an outage.

What GitHub is changing, and when

GitHub announced on November 2 that, starting December 2, 2026, GitHub Actions will block pull_request_target events by default in every public repository. A workflow that uses the trigger will only run if an Actions event policy explicitly allows it. The date was originally November 2; GitHub moved it out a month.

The rule arrives through what GitHub calls workflow execution protections. Right now it runs in evaluate mode, which means your workflows still run, with warnings, and GitHub records what it would have blocked. Private and internal repositories are not affected. The change covers public repositories on GitHub Free, Team and Enterprise Cloud. GitHub Enterprise Server is out of scope.

Before enforcement becomes permanent, there are two brownouts: November 9 and November 16, each from 16:00 to 18:00 UTC. That is 11 AM to 1 PM Eastern. During those windows the block is real. Workflow attempts the default rule catches will show up as failed runs with an error annotation, and the workflow won't execute. After each window the rule goes back to evaluate mode.

If you maintain an open-source library, a public SDK, a docs site or a demo repo that takes outside contributions, this is about you.

Sequence of work

The dates GitHub has published

  1. Now

    Default rule in evaluate mode: workflows run, with warnings. Insights shows what would be blocked.

  2. Nov 9, 11 AM–1 PM ET

    First brownout. Blocked pull_request_target runs fail with an error annotation.

  3. Nov 16, 11 AM–1 PM ET

    Second brownout. Same behavior; anything still failing is a leftover.

  4. Dec 2

    Enforcement becomes permanent in public repos unless an event policy allows the trigger.

Dates from GitHub's November 2, 2026 changelog; times converted to Eastern.

Why this trigger is the one being switched off

pull_request_target exists for a good reason. Ordinary pull_request runs triggered from a fork get no secrets and a read-only token, which is safe but can't do much. pull_request_target runs in the context of the base repository instead, with access to its secrets, so it can label a pull request, post a comment or update a status.

The trouble starts when a workflow on that trigger checks out and runs the code from the fork. Now someone else's code is running in a job that can see your secrets. GitHub's own explanation is blunt: untrusted code from a fork could compromise your pipeline or steal secrets. The default block is GitHub deciding that most repositories using the trigger didn't mean to accept that risk.

A brownout is the one outage you get to schedule. Use it to find out who was depending on the trigger.

A brownout is the one outage you get to schedule. Use it to find out who was depending on the trigger.

Find the workflows before November 9

Start where GitHub points you. Insights shows which workflow runs the rule would block. That list is the real answer, because it reflects what actually fired, not what is sitting in a folder.

Then check the repos themselves. Search the .github/workflows directory of every public repository you own for pull_request_target. The usual suspects are small and easy to forget: an auto-labeler, a bot that thanks first-time contributors, a preview deploy for docs, a contributor-agreement check, a size or changelog check that posts a comment. Many were copied from a template years ago and nobody on the current team remembers adding them.

For each one, write down three things in a short table: what the workflow does, whether it checks out or runs code from the pull request, and which secrets it can reach. That table is the whole decision. The workflows that only label or comment, and never touch the fork's code, are candidates to allow. Anything that builds, tests or executes fork code should not be on this trigger at all.

Do this before the first brownout, and the 11 AM window on November 9 becomes a confirmation rather than a surprise.

Rewrite, or allow on purpose

GitHub gives you two options. Keep the default rule and let it block the trigger, or explicitly allow pull_request_target in an applicable Actions event policy, using workflow file targeting so the permission covers specific workflow files instead of the whole repository.

For most repos, the right move is to rewrite. Tests, builds and lint for fork contributions belong on pull_request, where they run without secrets. If a later step genuinely needs to write back, such as posting results as a comment, split it into a separate workflow that runs after the unprivileged one finishes, reads the results as data and never executes the contributor's code.

Allow the trigger only for workflows that need write access and never check out the pull request's code, and name a person who reviews the file whenever it changes. Allowing a workflow by file means that file is now a security boundary. Treat edits to it the way you'd treat edits to a deploy key.

While you are in each file, tighten what's left. Set the workflow's permissions: block to the minimum it needs instead of inheriting the repository default, and check which secrets are referenced by name. A labeler needs permission to edit pull requests and issues; it does not need your package registry token or a cloud deploy key. Narrow scopes don't make a risky pattern safe, but they shrink what a mistake can reach.

Don't solve the brownout by allowing everything. That gets you through December 2 and keeps exactly the risk GitHub is trying to take off the table.

Decision guide

Keep the block, or allow one workflow

ConsiderationKeep the default blockAllow by workflow file
What the job needsRead-only checks, tests, lint, builds of fork codeLabeling, commenting or status updates that need write access
Fork codeRuns under pull_request with no secretsNever checked out or executed in the privileged job
Secrets in reachNoneOnly the narrow token the job truly needs
OwnerNobody has to watch itA named person reviews the file whenever it changes
Decision framework: assess each workflow against your own repository and secrets.

During the brownout, and after

On November 9, between 11 AM and 1 PM Eastern, watch the Actions tab of your busiest public repos. A failed run with GitHub's annotation is the system telling you where your list was incomplete. Fix it, or decide on purpose to allow it, before November 16. The second brownout should be quiet. If it isn't, you have two weeks until enforcement is permanent.

Tell your contributors, too. A short note in the repository's contributing guide or a pinned discussion saves a lot of confused comments when a check they're used to seeing doesn't appear on their pull request during the window.

After December 2, keep the habit. New workflows copied from old templates will keep reaching for pull_request_target. Add a line to your pull request review checklist for workflow files, and keep the table of allowed workflows somewhere the next engineer can find it.

If your team runs public repos alongside the products they support and wants a second pair of eyes on CI permissions and secrets, that's part of our web application engineering work. Get in touch.

Related work: Sutton|Place

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